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The spectacular growth of China in the last two decades has caused China 
to replace Japan as the major new source of U.S. imports and destination for 
our exports. This perception has not gone unnoticed by Japanese who often 
bemoan the relative decline of the perceived importance of Japan with the 
phrase, “Japan Passing.” Much less well known in the United States is how 
the rapid growth of trade with China is aﬀecting the world’s second largest 
economy. The explosion of trade between Japan and China has had pro-
found impacts on the Japanese economy and is frequently seen as a source 
of Japan’s persistent deﬂ  ation. For example, in a now famous article in the 
Financial Times, the Vice Minister and Deputy Vice Minister for Interna-
tional Aﬀairs at the Japanese Ministry of Finance wrote:
The entry of emerging market economies—such as China and other east 
Asian nations—into the global trading system is a powerful additional 
deﬂ  ationary force. Their combined supply capacity has been exerting 
downward pressure on the prices of goods in industrialised economies. . . . 
China is exporting deﬂ  ation and its eﬀects are not limited to neighboring 
Hong Kong and Taiwan.1
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2. The idea that the presence of China might be reducing prices is also popular in the United 
States. Broda and Romalis (2008) estimate the impact that China has had on the prices of 
goods paid by diﬀerent income groups in America. Bergin and Feenstra (2007) argue that the 
rise in China’s share of U.S. imports may explain the lower pass-  through of exchange rates to 
U.S. import prices.
This notion that China was exporting deﬂ  ation by exporting goods at low 
prices was repeated by market analysts and policymakers both inside and 
outside of Japan.2
In this chapter, we assess the impact that Chinese exports have had on 
Japanese consumer prices in the years between 1992 and 2005. We start 
by showing that although the oﬃcial Japanese import price index (IPI) is 
based on a Laspeyres index formula, it diﬀers importantly to a standard 
Laspeyres index in terms of how goods are sampled and weighted. As a 
result, we show an IPI computed using a pure Laspeyres formula would 
have resulted in substantial inﬂ  ation over this period. This suggests that one 
cannot separate one’s interpretation of the direction in which aggregate 
Japanese prices were moving from the methodologies used. The fact that 
index number problems are suﬃciently large in Japanese import price data to 
bias the numbers downward by 1 percentage point per year could easily have 
confused policymakers and economists alike about how trade was aﬀecting 
price movements in Japan.
Despite this aggregate pattern, the notion that China might be exporting 
deﬂ  ation may be warranted given the importance of China in Japan’s trade 
and the perception that Chinese products are falling in price. The rise in 
importance of China in Japan’s import and export structure over this period 
has been dramatic and has happened simultaneously with a sharp decline 
in the importance of the United States. In 1992, the United States exported 
three times as much to Japan as China; by 2005, China was exporting twice 
as much as the United States. Moreover, between 1992 and 2005, the num-
ber of new imported varieties entering Japan rose by 32 percent, and China 
played an enormous role in this expansion—accounting for 11 percent of 
the total. This is more than twice the level we observed in the United States 
over a similar period. The fact that the United States and China have traded 
places, or at least traded trade shares, is not a fact that is well known in the 
United States and is likely to dramatically alter Japanese- United States rela-
tions in the future.
Understanding the price impact of the expansion of Chinese exports is 
more complex. Although China plays a large role in Japanese imports, we 
ﬁ  nd no evidence that import prices from China fell faster than those from 
other countries. In those categories where China already had a presence in 
1992, we do not ﬁ  nd that Chinese prices fell more rapidly than those of other 
exporters to Japan. Moreover, the impact of Chinese competition to other 
exporters is also small. There is no evidence that the entry of Chinese ﬁ  rms 
into new markets has any signiﬁ  cant impact on the pricing behavior of other Exporting Deﬂ  ation? Chinese Exports and Japanese Prices    2 0 5
3. The impact of Chinese imports on the pricing of domestic competitors is beyond the 
scope of this paper. This might be an important channel through which Chinese imports aﬀect 
Japanese prices, but a clean match between trade data and data on domestic prices is hard to 
obtain.
4. This is a problem in the computation of most price indexes around the world, not only 
the Japanese IPI. To conﬁ  rm that this is true in the Japanese case, we show that one can repli-
cate the oﬃcial IPI very closely using unit value data for the set of imports that are common 
throughout the period. This is strong evidence that the impact of new and better products is 
not captured in oﬃcial statistics.
exporting countries.3 Clearly, what is driving the rapid expansion of Chinese 
exports into Japan is not lower prices for existing goods.
Given the large growth of varieties coming from China, it is possible that 
the popular belief that China is exporting deﬂ  ation is being driven by the 
constant introduction of cheap Chinese products in Japanese markets. It 
is important to notice that the introduction of new products would not be 
captured in existing price indexes, which usually ignore product entry and 
exit.4 In order to identify the impact that a new product has on prices, we 
need to understand its welfare implications. Intuitively, the introduction of 
a new product reduces the cost of living for consumers (i.e., the true price 
index) if the price- per- unit  quality of the new product is lower than that of 
existing products (i.e., higher quality or lower price than existing products) 
or if the new product is suﬃciently diﬀerent from existing products that 
consumers value the additional choice. Lower price-  per-  unit quality and 
higher variety of Chinese products could also explain the large increase in 
Chinese shares in the recent period.
We use a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregator to back 
out the implied impact of new products on the Japanese cost of living. We 
ﬁ  nd that there has been a remarkable decrease in the price-  per-  unit quality 
of Chinese exports. Price-  per-  unit quality of Chinese exports halved dur-
ing this period, due largely to quality upgrading. This is one of the most 
dramatic increases in quality that we observe in the data. In other words, 
while prices of Chinese products as computed in oﬃcial statistics are not 
falling by more than those of other exports to China, the quality of Chinese 
products is rising relative to those of other countries. However, we ﬁ  nd the 
quantitative signiﬁ  cance of this quality growth to be small. If the Japanese 
were to correct for the increase in quality in Chinese products in the IPI, then 
the quality- adjusted import price inﬂ  ation would only be 1 percentage point 
smaller than the actual import inﬂ  ation over the 1992 to 2004 period.
While the speciﬁ  c price impact of new products from China is small, the 
impact of all new and higher quality imports can account for a fall in Japa-
nese import prices of as much as 10 percentage points over the 1992 to 2004 
period. This is smaller than the impact that new products had in the United 
States and several other developed countries (see Broda and Weinstein 2006) 
but still important given that the oﬃcial IPI has been relatively ﬂ  at over this 
entire period. However, given that imports are such a small share of Japan’s 206        Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein
5. This number is roughly coming from the fact that the import share of Japan is around 
10 percent.
6. An important channel that we do not explore in this paper is the exact quantitative role 
that globalization has on Japan’s prices through the competitive pressure that imported goods 
put on domestic producers.
7. See http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm.
overall consumption, the deﬂ  ationary impact of new imported goods in 
Japan’s is still small, at around 1 percentage point throughout the entire 
period.5
In sum, China is not placing a strong deﬂ  ationary impact on the actual 
Japanese IPI either directly through lower inﬂ  ation of existing Chinese 
products or through competition to other Japanese exporters. Moreover, 
the magnitude of the eﬀect of new goods from China in Japanese import 
prices is clearly deﬂ  ationary, but the eﬀect is small. Taking into account all 
of Japan’s new imported products, this eﬀect can explain part of the per-
ception that globalization is reducing import prices in Japan. Despite the 
large impact of new and better products in the quality- adjusted IPI, the low 
level of imports in consumption suggest that the impact of globalization on 
consumer prices is still small in Japan.6
6.1      Japan’s Trade with China
6.1.1    Overview
We ﬁ rst provide an overview of Japanese exports and imports. For our 
initial overview of Japanese import and export data, we rely on the aggre-
gates provided by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.7 Between 1988 and 
2006, Japanese imports rose by 181 percent, and Japanese exports rose by 
122 percent in nominal terms. Interestingly, imports from and exports to the 
United States rose at rates that were only a third as fast (46 and 47 percent, 
respectively). By contrast, exports to China rose by 454 percent, and imports 
from China rose by a whopping 810 percent. These numbers do not simply 
reﬂ  ect rapid growth from a low base. Of the 84 trillion yen worth of total 
new trade that arose during this period, over one-  third was due to trade 
with China.
Figure 6.1 documents movements in the import structure of Japan. The 
ﬁ  gure makes clear the very rapid change in position of the United States 
and China. Although one cannot see it in the ﬁ  gure, in 1975 Japan not only 
imported more from the United States than China, but it also imported more 
from the United States than all of East Asia. East Asia gradually overtook 
China as a source of Japanese imports in the late seventies, but the rise of 
imports from China did not really take oﬀ until 1990. Until 1998, the rise of 
imports from China did not entail any deterioration in the share of imports 
emanating from the United States. Thereafter, the importance of the United Exporting Deﬂ  ation? Chinese Exports and Japanese Prices    2 0 7
States as a Japanese trading partner entered a steep decline. Interestingly, 
all of the increase in imports from East Asia reﬂ  ects the growth in imports 
from China. In fact, the share of imports from East Asia excluding China 
(and Hong Kong) actually fell from 23 percent in 1988 to 22 percent by 2006. 
Thus, the growth in imports from China was not matched by a more general 
growth in imports from East Asia more broadly.
One can observe a similar pattern in the export ﬂ  ows emanating from 
Japan as shown in ﬁ  gure 6.2. Although Japanese exports to China have not 
overtaken those to the United States, there is clear evidence of a dramatic 
change in the relative positions of the two countries. Between 1988 and 2006, 
the share of Japanese exports going to either China or the United States 
stood at a remarkably stable 42 percent. However, in 1988, 34 percent of 
Japanese exports were destined for the US as compared to only 23 percent by 
2006. Thus, on both the import and export side one can observe a dramatic 
increase in the interdependency of the Japanese and Chinese economies.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 report changes in the importance of the top twenty-
 ﬁ ve exporters to Japan by aggregating up nine-  digit bilateral data supplied 
by the Japan Tariﬀ Association. We shift to these data because it allows us 
to examine Japanese trade in far more detail than the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) data. The top twenty-  ﬁ  ve exporters accounted for 88 percent of 
all Japanese imports in both 1992 and 2005. The rise in oil prices over this 
Fig. 6.1    Share of Japanese imports by source country or region
Notes: East Asia is deﬁ  ned to be Cambodia; China; China (Hong Kong); China (Taiwan); 
Korea, Dem. PP. Rep.; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Myanmar; The Philippines; Singa-
pore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; Vietnam; Indonesia; China is deﬁ  ned to be China and China 
(Hong Kong).208        Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein
time period has dramatically increased the importance of countries like 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Qatar as a source of imports. 
Other than shifts due to the rise in oil prices, there do not appear to be any 
substantial shifts in the relative rankings of East Asian sources of supply, 
with the major exception of Hong Kong. Hong Kong appears to have fallen 
dramatically as a source of supply as goods are shipped from other locations 
in China. Interestingly, imports from the other growing giant, India, actually 
fell as a share of total Japanese imports by 30 percent, indicating that the 
remarkable recent growth in that country has not produced a comparable 
increase in exports to Japan.
6.1.2    Growth  in  Varieties
There are many ways in which one can deﬁ  ne a “variety.” In this paper, 
we deﬁ  ne varieties as in Broda and Weinstein (2006), that is, the imports of 
a Harmonized System (HS) nine- digit good from a particular country. This 
deﬁ  nition is close to the concept ﬁ  rst suggested by Armington (1969) and is 
consistent with a wide class of monopolistic competition models.
Table 6.3 documents that the number of varieties entering Japan rose by 
32 percent between 1992 and 2005, that is, from 71,666 varieties in 1992 to 
just under 95,000 varieties in 2005. There is always a question when using 
this deﬁ  nition of variety growth about how much of the growth can be 
attributed to an increase in the number of categories and how much is due 
to an increase in new varieties per se. As one can see from the table, the count 
Fig. 6.2    Share of Japanese exports by source country or region
Note: See ﬁ  gure 6.1 notes.Exporting Deﬂ  ation? Chinese Exports and Japanese Prices    2 0 9
of new varieties entering Japan rose 32 percent over this time period, whereas 
the average number countries exporting a particular variety grew by 31 per-
cent. Thus, virtually all of the increase in new varieties imported by Japan 
can be ascribed to new sources of imports of particular nine-  digit goods.
In table 6.4, we report the relative contributions of diﬀerent exporters to 
Japanese import variety growth. China’s contribution is roughly double that 
of the next highest contributor over this time period, Vietnam. Although 
non-  Chinese, East-  Asian exporters did not expand their total exports to 
Japan dramatically over this time period, they did play a central role in the 
expansion of new varieties entering Japan. Just over a quarter of new va-
rieties entering Japan came from these countries, and East Asia as a whole 
accounted for 37 percent of Japanese variety growth. By contrast, the num-
ber of varieties coming from the largest exporter to Japan over this time 
period, the United States, actually fell slightly. Thus, the picture of what is 
happening with the number of varieties complements that of what happened 
with imports as a whole—there was a substantial expansion of varieties 
Table 6.1  Ranking in terms of goods imported by Japan
Country   1992   1995   2000   2005  
Change 
1992–2005
United States 1112 – 1
China 2221 1
Australia 3475 – 2
Indonesia 4657 – 3
Republic of Korea 5336 – 1
Germany 6 7 10 9 –3
SU ARAB 7 12 9 3 4
United Arab Emirates 8 10 6 4 4
Taiwan 9 5 4 8 1
Canada 10 8 12 14 –4
Malaysia 11 9 8 11 0
Thailand 12 11 11 10 2
France 13 15 16 15 –2
United Kingdom 14 13 14 19 –5
Italy 15 16 19 18 –3
Switzerland 16 18 23 24 –8
Singapore 17 14 15 20 –3
Brazil 18 19 25 26 –8
Iran 19 23 18 13 6
Russia 20 17 21 21 –1
The Philippines 21 20 13 16 5
Qatar 22 31 17 12 10
Hong Kong 23 25 36 39 –16
India 24 22 29 28 –4
Oman   25   34   33   29   –4210        Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein
from East Asia, and especially from China, and a relative decline of the 
importance of the United States.
6.2      Implications for Japanese Prices
The preceding data preview suggests a number of important possibilities 
of the impact of globalization and Chinese exports in particular on Japan. 
In order to examine this, it is important to keep track of impacts arising 
from the price movements of existing goods and those of new goods entering 
Japan. To the extent that exports from China have driven down the price of 
existing imports relative to exports, this would be reﬂ  ected as a terms-  of-
  trade gain in Japan statistics. By contrast, the availability of new imported 
products would tend to drive down Japanese prices, but this eﬀect would be 
mostly missed by oﬃcial statistics. This happens as new varieties eﬀectively 
constitute a fall in price from the reservation level to the observed level, but 
this fall in prices is ignored by most statistical oﬃces around the world.
A goal of this paper is to examine the importance of these forces in the 
Table 6.2  Share of total Japanese imports of the top 25 exporters in 1992
Country   1992   1995   2000   2005  
Change 
1992–2005
United States 0.224 0.224 0.190 0.124 –0.100
China 0.073 0.107 0.145 0.210 0.138
Australia 0.053 0.043 0.039 0.048 –0.006
Indonesia 0.052 0.042 0.043 0.040 –0.012
Republic of Korea 0.050 0.051 0.054 0.047 –0.002
Germany 0.046 0.041 0.034 0.035 –0.012
SU ARAB 0.044 0.029 0.037 0.056 0.012
United Arab Emirates 0.042 0.030 0.039 0.049 0.007
Taiwan 0.041 0.043 0.047 0.035 –0.006
Canada 0.033 0.032 0.023 0.017 –0.016
Malaysia 0.028 0.031 0.038 0.028 0.000
Thailand 0.026 0.030 0.028 0.030 0.005
France 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.017 –0.007
United Kingdom 0.021 0.021 0.017 0.013 –0.008
Italy 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.013 –0.005
Switzerland 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.010 –0.004
Singapore 0.013 0.020 0.017 0.013 0.000
Brazil 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.009 –0.004
Iran 0.011 0.008 0.014 0.020 0.009
Russia 0.010 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.002
The Philippines 0.010 0.010 0.019 0.015 0.005
Qatar 0.009 0.006 0.015 0.021 0.011
Hong Kong 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.003 –0.006
India 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.006 –0.003
Oman   0.008   0.006   0.005   0.005   –0.003Exporting Deﬂ  ation? Chinese Exports and Japanese Prices    2 1 1
8. See http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/exp/stat/pi/data/ecgpi00.pdf.
case of Japan. However, before we do so, we need to delve a little deeper 
into the data. One possible source of Japanese import data are the oﬃcial 
IPIs provided by the Bank of Japan. These indexes are based on a sample of 
896 prices in the 1995 base index and 1601 prices in the 2000 index (Bank of 
Japan 2002). This is between 1–2 percent of the total number of unit values 
reported in the Japan Tariﬀ Association data. Thus, the sample of prices 
used in the oﬃcial index is much smaller than that universe of import prices. 
We will compare the Bank of Japan data with indexes derived using the data 
from the Tariﬀ Association.
6.2.1    The  Oﬃcial Import Price Index (IPI)
The Japanese IPI is not constructed as a simple Laspeyres index. The 
Japanese IPI is computed using a nonrandom sample of import prices. In 
particular, the index samples commodities with a minimum transaction 
value (18.8 billion yen in 2000).8 These prices are then averaged together 
using weights that are set every ﬁ  ve years. The fact that weights are not 
updated annually but at longer frequencies (most recently 1995 and 2000) 
will give rise to diﬀerences between what are considered best-practice indexes 
formulas and oﬃcial Japanese indexes.
Finally, it is worth noting that the IPI, like most oﬃcial indexes, can-
not be used to assess the importance of new varieties entering Japan. The 
importance of this can be seen by examining the last four rows of table 
6.3. Only about two-  thirds of the varieties that were imported in 1992 were 
also imported in 2005, and, similarly, one-  third of the goods imported in 
2005 were not imported in 1992. This underscores the importance played of 
new and disappearing varieties in import ﬂ  ows and suggests that an index 
based on a common set of goods is going to miss a lot of the implied price 
changes.
Table 6.3  Variety in Japan’s imports (1992–2005)
   
Total no. of 
varieties 
(country- good 









Share of total 
U.S. imports 
in year
All 1992 goods 71,666 15.0 17.0 1.00
All 2005 goods 94,707 19.0 22.2 1.00
Common 1992–2005
 1992 58,641 15.0 17.4 0.67
 2005 75,519 21.0 23.2 0.69
1992 not in 2005 13,025 12.0 15.1 0.33
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However, a major advantage of using the oﬃcial data is that by deﬁ  ning 
products precisely, the oﬃcial index avoids the problem that movements 
in unit values may reﬂ  ect changes in the composition of underlying goods 
rather than changes in the prices themselves. Certainly, it is easy to ﬁ  nd in 
the data examples of wild unit value movements that almost surely reﬂ  ect 
measurement issues, but these data problems have to be set against the fact 
that by working with unit value data, one can have access to a vastly broader 
set of price data. Moreover, by working with unit values, one can also use 
comparable quantity data.
To further assess the relative costs and beneﬁ  ts of unit value versus oﬃcial 
import price data, we can compare the actual import inﬂ  ation that would 
be implied from unit value data in the recent years. In order to deal with 
data problems in the unit value data, we dropped observations where the 
ratio of the future price to the past price exceeds 3 or is less than 0.33 or if 
the units reported for the quantity data changed. We built all of our indexes 
with base years of 1992 and 2000 so that the rebasing closely matches that of 
the oﬃcial index. Figure 6.3 presents a comparison between our Laspeyres 
index and the oﬃcial one. Interestingly the geometric price index computed 
using unit value data using the basic index formulas tracks the oﬃcial index 
very closely, but our pure Laspeyres index exhibits much more import price 
inﬂ  ation. Although the documentation for the Japanese IPI is not suﬃciently 
Fig. 6.3    Laspeyres index versus oﬃcial import price index
Notes: Geometric and Laspeyres indexes are computed using unit value data. Unit values are 
trimmed to remove unit values whose ratios increase by more 3 or fall by more than 0.3. We 
also drop all imports of less than 1 million yen. Base years for the oﬃcial index are 1990, 1995, 
and 2000. Base years for the other indexes are 1992 and 2000.Exporting Deﬂ  ation? Chinese Exports and Japanese Prices    2 1 5
detailed to let us know how the sampling aﬀects the index, it appears to 
dramatically reduce IPIs. Nevertheless, the correlation between the annual 
inﬂ  ation rates between the unit value index that uses a Laspeyres formula 
and the oﬃcial index is 0.952, and 0.948 with the unit value index that uses 
a geometric formula. This high correlation suggests that despite the noise 
in the unit values, the index based on unit values traces the oﬃcial inﬂ  ation 
rates very closely. In the rest of the paper, we will use this remarkable rela-
tionship as an important building block for understanding the impact that 
formula and variety changes can have on the Japanese IPI.
Given that a unit value price index traces the oﬃcial index so closely, 
we can assess the sensitivity of inﬂ  ation rates to various formula biases. 
Figure 6.4 shows the IPI using a Laspeyres formula and a number of other 
indexes—Fisher, Törnqvist, CES, geometric, and Paasche—together with 
the oﬃcial IPI. If the index were closer to a pure Laspeyres, it would have 
signiﬁ  cant upward bias. All of these indexes are constructed with base years 
of 1992 and 2000. Between 1992 and 2005, the Laspeyres index rose 1.1 
percent per year faster than the geometric index (which closely matches 
the oﬃcial index) and 0.6 percent per year faster than the Törnqvist and 
Fisher indexes. The Törnqvist and geometric indexes diﬀer in that the for-
mer uses weights from both the base and ﬁ  nal year, while the latter only 
uses weights from the earlier year. Interestingly, the geometric price index 
Fig. 6.4    Formula biases in Japanese import price indexes
Notes: Geometric and Laspeyres indexes are computed using unit value data. Unit values are 
trimmed to remove unit values whose ratios increase by more 3 or fall by more than 0.3. We 
also drop all imports of less than 1 million yen. Base years for the oﬃcial index are 1990, 1995, 
and 2000. Base years for the other indexes are 1992 and 2000. The Paasche, CES, Fisher, and 
Törnqvist indexes are all computed using the current and base year weights (i.e., not chained 
weights).216        Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein
9. The reason for this diﬀerence can be traced to what is referred to in the literature as the 
upper-  level substitution bias that is not corrected using a Laspeyres index, but is accounted 
for using a geometric index.
10. Similarly, the fact that the Bureau of Labor Statistics’s import and export price indexes 
are essentially pure Laspeyres indexes indicates that the diﬀerent formulas used by interna-
tional statistical agencies can produce substantially diﬀerent pictures of what is happening to 
import prices.
seems to understate inﬂ  ation relative to the superlative indexes. These large 
diﬀerences underscore the importance of using the same methodology when 
making inferences between price indexes in a country (or across countries 
as in Broda and Weinstein 2007).
According to the Bank of Japan Web site, between 1992 and 2002, import 
prices fell by 9 percent or almost 1 percent per year. Given that Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) inﬂ  ation over this time period averaged 0.2 percent, it is 
argued that dropping import prices tended to pull down average prices in 
Japan. The surprising conclusion is that a Japanese IPI based on a pure 
Laspeyres methodology registered an average inﬂ  ation rate of 0.0 percent 
over the same time period.9 This suggests that the perception that import 
prices were falling as Japan entered into a period of deﬂ  ation was driven by 
the fact that the IPI is not constructed like a pure Laspeyres index. Had the 
IPI been constructed as a pure Laspeyres index like the CPI, the inﬂ  ation 
rates of import prices would have been higher.10
The dispersion in the formula biases is also remarkable. One of the strik-
ing features of the plot is the behavior of prices between 1992 and 2002. 
Much of the inﬂ  ation in Japanese import prices is driven by a very rapid 
increase in import prices at the end of the sample. If we focus on the period 
between 1992 and 2002, the time when MOF oﬃcials were making their 
statements, the drop in import prices is a bit more pronounced. Almost this 
entire drop occurred between 1997 and 2002. Thus, there is some evidence 
that import prices were falling in Japan around the time that Japan entered 
deﬂ  ation. We also can rerun this analysis using annual base updating. Inter-
estingly, updating the base years each year tends to cause measured inﬂ  ation 
to rise in these data. Annual base updating causes the Fisher and Törnqvist 
indexes to rise by 0.7 and 0.6 percent faster, respectively, over the whole time 
period. The Laspeyres inﬂ  ation rate rises by a whopping 1.5 percent per year 
with annual base updating.
This suggests that the recent move to increase the rate of base updating 
in CPI could cause Japanese inﬂ  ation to appear to be higher. Our data sug-
gests that had the (BOJ) been using a superlative index like the Fisher or 
Törnqvist and updating the base annually, they would have found that prices 
had actually been rising slightly between 1992 and 2002 and even between 
1997 and 2002. This type of index would have shown that between 1997 and 
2002, prices didn’t actually fall by 9 percent; they actually rose by 2 percent! 
Similarly, using superlative indexes with base years of 1992 and 2000, half Exporting Deﬂ  ation? Chinese Exports and Japanese Prices    2 1 7
of the price drop disappears. As one can see in ﬁ  gure 6.4, superlative indexes 
computed with these base years suggest a fall in prices of only 5 percent. 
Thus, formula bias may be the reason why it appeared that Japanese deﬂ  a-
tion occurred at the same time as import price deﬂ  ation.
Figure 6.4 also provides other interesting facts. Not surprisingly, the two 
superlative indexes, the Fisher and Törnqvist, yield almost identical rates of 
inﬂ  ation. Perhaps more surprising is that the CES price index is also almost 
indistinguishable from the superlative indexes. This will be a useful fact that 
we will use later to argue that the variety bias using a CES aggregator is 
probably a reasonable approximation of the true bias.
These biases are summarized in table 6.5. For each index, we express the 
bias in terms of the implied average annual inﬂ  ation rate using that formula 
relative to the Törnqvist formula. Clearly, the choice of formula matters 
enormously. In nine out of the thirteen years between 1992 and 2005, the 
Törnqvist index diﬀered from the oﬃcial index in sign; this, in conjunction 
with the fact that the oﬃcial index diﬀers from the conventional   Laspeyres 
index, suggests that the precise methodology used to sample prices can 
qualitatively aﬀect our understanding of what is happening to Japanese 
import prices. Nevertheless, no matter how we compute Japanese IPIs using 
common goods, it appears that there is no clear declining trend in import 
prices.
6.2.2    Chinese  Export  Prices
It is possible that China is having an impact on Japanese import prices 
that is more subtle than what we can detect using aggregate IPIs. China is 
often seen as a low-  cost competitor in many markets, and this is something 
that we can see clearly in our data. In table 6.6, we report regressions in 
which we regress the log unit values on a dummy that equals 1 if the source 
is China. We include HS nine- digit ﬁ  xed eﬀects in the ﬁ  rst set of regressions 
and HS four- digit ﬁ  xed eﬀects in the second set to control for cross- product 
variation in prices. The coeﬃcient on the China dummy corresponds to how 
much cheaper Chinese imports are than other imports in the same nine-   or 
four- digit  category.
The results using the nine-  digit dummies indicate that in 1992, Chinese 
Table 6.5  Formula biases of import price indexes (1992–2005)
    Laspeyres   Paasche   Geometric   CES   Fisher   Oﬃcial
Median bias of 
index relative to 
Törnqvist 0.4 –0.6 –0.7 0.0 –0.1 –0.4
Standard deviation 
of measurement 
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exports to Japan were 0.0.92 log units cheaper than other exports in the same 
nine- digit category. This means that Chinese exports were 60 percent cheaper 
than other imports in the same narrowly deﬁ  ned category in 1992 and 65 
percent cheaper in 2005. If we weight the observations by the share, there 
appears to be a bit steeper decline: weighted Chinese prices were 34 percent 
cheaper in 1992 and 61 percent cheaper in 2005. However, it is diﬃcult to 
tell from these two cross-  sectional regressions whether the drop in relative 
prices was due to the entry of new, cheaper Chinese imports or declines in 
the price of existing imports.
In order to examine the source of this price decline, we focus on the set of 
common Chinese imports. Here again, we drop unit values whose relative 
price movements are not in the interval [0.3, 3] or if the units change and 
include HS nine-  digit dummies. The data does not suggest that the prices 
of goods exported by China in 1992 fell at a faster rate than those exported 
by other countries over this time period. Essentially, the relative prices of 
Chinese prices show no relative decline compared to those of other countries 
in the same product categories. This suggests that whatever is driving the 
rapid expansion of Chinese exports to Japan, it is not a general decline in 
prices charged by Chinese producers for existing goods.
These results diﬀer from those of Schott (2006), who found that unit 
values of Chinese exports to the United States declined substantially. This 
result seems to be due to the treatment of Hong Kong. In our data, if we treat 
Hong Kong and China as two diﬀerent countries, we obtain an analogous 
result with Chinese prices falling signiﬁ  cantly, but prices from Hong Kong 
rising signiﬁ  cantly. These two forces cancel each other out and may reﬂ  ect 
that the composition of goods passing through Hong Kong is changing but 
that there is no signiﬁ  cant change in Chinese exports broadly deﬁ  ned.
We have already seen that China has been playing a major role in the 
expansion of new varieties into Japan. One possible implication of this is 
that the entry of new Chinese products is driving down the prices of other 
competing exporters. In order to examine this, we regressed the change in the 
log of the average price of the other exporters in a HS nine- digit category on 
whether a Chinese ﬁ  rm entered that sector or exited. We also include year-
  HS four-  digit interaction dummies to control for industry level variation 
that might be correlated with Chinese entry or exit.
In the ﬁ  rst three columns of table 6.7, we report the results from this exer-
cise. When we do not include HS four- digit year eﬀects, we ﬁ  nd that the entry 
of a Chinese exporter into a new market is associated with an 0.8 percent 
decline in the prices charged by other ﬁ  rms. However, when we include HS 
four-  digit year eﬀects, this relationship loses statistical signiﬁ  cance. More-
over, the exit of China from a Japanese import market is not associated with 
any increase in the relative prices of the other goods. In order to see whether 
the eﬀect of Chinese entry or exit might take some time to have an impact 
on the prices of other producers, we also ran speciﬁ  cations in which we 220        Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein
included one-   and two-  year lags of the entry and exit variables. Neither of 
these variables was signiﬁ  cantly associated with a price change of imports 
of the other goods changed.
Our results from these exercises indicate that Chinese exports do not 
appear to have a diﬀerential impact on Japanese import prices when exam-
ined through conventional approaches. Chinese export prices into Japan are 
not falling faster than prices of other comparable nine-  digit goods. More-
over, the entry or exit of a Chinese ﬁ  rm in a nine-  digit sector does not tend 
to cause any signiﬁ  cant movement in the prices of other ﬁ  rms.
6.3    The  Variety  Eﬀect
The results from the previous section suggest that China has been a major 
contributor to the expansion in new varieties that have been entering the 
Japanese market over the last ﬁ  fteen years. In particular, China and other 
exporters that have entered the Japanese market could have an impact on 
inﬂ  ation in Japan through the expansion of exported varieties. Common 
goods price indexes cannot measure the impact of new varieties on prices 
by deﬁ  nition. However, if we think about the entry of new goods as unmea-
sured price drops, and consumption goods are produced using these inputs, 
it is possible that consumer prices might be falling as a result of the entry of 
new producers into the market.
Table 6.7  Fixed eﬀects regressions of year-  on-  year log price change of non-  Chinese exports to 
Japan against dummy variables indicating China’s entry or exit from the market 
(1992–2005)
China Entryt –0.008 –0.004 –0.002 –0.006 –0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
China Exitt –0.004 –0.004 –0.004 –0.002 –0.004 –0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
China Entryt–1 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
China Exitt–1 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
China Entryt–2 0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
China Exitt–2 –0.004 –0.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant –0.006 0.001 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
No. of observations 89,717 79,317 70,200 89,717 79,317 70,200
No. of years 13 12 11 13 12 11
No. of year-  HS code 
combinations
0 0 0 15,500 14,123 12,798
R2   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. HS   Harmonized System.Exporting Deﬂ  ation? Chinese Exports and Japanese Prices    2 2 1
We now turn to understanding this eﬀect more clearly. Our estimation 
framework is identical to that of Broda and Weinstein (2006), and we repeat 
some of their underlying theory here in an abbreviated format.
We begin by assuming that consumers purchase and derive utility from a 
ﬁ  nal good Ut that is produced using domestic and foreign varieties.
(1) U t   (Dt
(κ 1)/κ   Mt
(κ 1)/κ)κ/(κ 1); κ   1,
where Mt is the composite imported good to be deﬁ  ned in the following, Dt is 
the domestic good, and κ is the elasticity of substitution between both goods. 
Moving to the second tier, we deﬁ  ne the composite imported good as:





;     1,
where Mgt is the subutility derived from the consumption of imported good 
g in time t,   denotes the elasticity of substitution among imported goods, 
and G is the set of all imported goods. This subutility function can be rep-
resented by:




t (mgct)( g 1)/ g
 g/( g 1)
;  g   1 ∀g ∈ G,
where  g is the elasticity of substitution among varieties of good g, which is 
assumed to exceed unity; for each good, imports are treated as diﬀerentiated 
across countries of supply, c (as in Armington 1969); mgct corresponds to the 
imports of good g from country c in time t, that is, we identify varieties of 
import good g with their countries of origin; C is the set of all countries; and 
dgct denotes a taste or quality parameter for good g from country c.
We will work with the main proposition of Broda and Weinstein (2006), 
which is an extension of one found in Feenstra (1994). Let I be the set of 
goods available at some time, It be set of goods available in time t, and Ig 
be the set of varieties in good g that are available in two time periods. We 
denote the price and quantity vectors by pt, and xt and individual prices of 
varieties by pgct.
PROPOSITION (Broda and Weinstein 2006): If Ig   Ø ∀g ∈ G and dgct   
dgct–1 for c ∈ Ig ∀g ∈ G, then the exact aggregate IPI with variety change is 
given by:
(4)   M(pt,pt 1,xt,xt 1,I)   CIPI(I) Π
g∈G




where CIPI refers to the conventional CES IPI:
(5) CIPI(I)   Π
g∈G
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 and  gt 1   ∑c∈Igpgct 1xgct 1
  
∑c∈Igt 1pgct 1xgct 1
.
In order to compute the impact of new varieties on the Japanese economy 
given by equation (4). Our identiﬁ  cation strategy is identical to that in Feen-
stra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006).
6.4    Results
6.4.1      The Quality of Chinese Exports
Before we turn to estimating the bias in the Japanese IPI due to new varie-
ties entering Japan, it is useful to examine what has been happening to the 
quality of imports by country. The ﬁ  rst point to realize is that with the CES 
approach we have adopted, we can measure both the relative quality of new 
varieties as well as quality upgrading of existing varieties.
A maintained assumption in our proposition is that the set of common 
goods does not experience quality upgrading. If we suspected the goods of 
a country, say, China to be increasing over time, we could drop those goods 
from the set of common goods and consider them as goods that disappeared 
in the ﬁ  rst period and were replaced in the second. In this case, the contri-
bution to quality of these goods would appear as a drop in the   ratio. An 
alternative method of identifying implied quality changes is to examine how 
the shares of the common goods after controlling for price changes. This is 
the approach we follow in this section.
To see how to measure quality upgrading of existing goods in the CES 
framework, consider the CES demand function:





where sigvt is the share of expenditures on variety v in time t, and Egt is 
aggregate expenditure on good g in time t. If we take logs of equation (7), 
we obtain:
(8) ln  sigvt   (1    g)ln
pigvt  
digvt   (1    g)lnPgt.
We can rewrite this as:
(4 ) ln  sigvt    gt   (1    g)ln
pigvt  
digvt   (1    g)ln
pigvt  
digvt,
where the terms with bars over them indicate the average for a good in 
time t.
In this case, the term in curly brackets can be thought of as how move-Exporting Deﬂ  ation? Chinese Exports and Japanese Prices    2 2 3
11. An alternative interpretation is that the residual captures the number of subvarieties of 
the product. However, to the extent that one can think of expansions of subvarieties of a good 
(e.g., increasing the number of car models) as a rise in quality, this interpretation is isomorphic 
to a quality story.
12. Because of the size of the data set, we limited our analysis to the 100 largest exporters 
to Japan in 1992.
ments in price-  per-  unit quality have been aﬀecting market shares. In par-
ticular, if the price-  per-  unit quality is high for a given variety in a moment 
in time, this term will be positive. This suggests that if we regress the shares 
of products on HS nine-  digit year ﬁ  xed eﬀects, the residuals can be inter-
preted as how price-  per-  unit quality has been aﬀecting the market share 
of that country.11 If we think that price-  per-  unit quality of the common 
exports have remained relatively constant over time, we should expect that 
this residual should not demonstrate any trend. However, if price-  per-  unit 
quality is falling, then we should expect to see this residual rise.
In order to see what was happening to these residuals, we estimated equa-
tion (6) and included country dummies so that each country’s residuals 
would be normalized around zero.12 We then plotted the mean and median 
residuals for the nine largest non- oil exporters to Japan (see ﬁ  gure 6.5). The 
results are quite striking. For most countries, there is little movement in the 
mean or median residuals; however, Chinese residuals exhibit a dramatic rise 
Fig. 6.5    Mean residuals for goods exported to Japan in all years from 1992 to 
2005, top nine exporters to Japan in 1992 (excluding Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries [OPEC] countries)
Note: Graphs by exporter rank in 1992.224        Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein
over time. Of the 100 largest exporters to Japan, China exhibits the highest 
increase in market share due to quality-  adjusted price movements. Chinese 
market share rose by a factor of 3.3 (1.2 log units) due to quality upgrading. 
By contrast of the ﬁ  fty largest exporters to Japan, most experienced market 
share shifts due to quality-  adjusted price movements of less than plus or 
minus 26 percent. This suggests that a major reason for the increase in the 
intensive margin of Chinese exports is lower price-  per-  unit quality.
We can do a back-  of-  the-  envelope calculation to get some sense of how 
much price-  per-  unit quality needed to fall in order to produce this rise in 
market share. If the quality of the remains unchanged, then we can rewrite 
equation (4) as:
   ln
pigvt  
digvt   
 lnsigvt  
(1    g)
.
The median change in the log share of a Chinese variety during this period 
was 1.45, and the median elasticity estimate was 2.9. Substituting these 
values into the preceding equation suggests that the price-  per-  unit quality 
of the typical Chinese good fell by 54 percent over this time period. This 
suggests substantial quality upgrading by Chinese manufacturers.
6.4.2      Globalization and Japanese Prices
In order to estimate the impact of new varieties on Japanese prices as 
indicated by equation (4), we need to compute the lambda ratios and esti-
mate the elasticities. To simplify the analysis, we deﬁ  ne “goods” as HS 
four-  digit categories, which divides Japanese imports into just over 1,000 
categories.
Table 6.8 documents the summary statistics for the lambda ratios. In 
the typical sector, the lambda ratio is 0.96. This implies that if all varie-
ties entered utility symmetrically, then the number of varieties would have 
increased by about 4 percent over this time period. Most of the ratios are 
distributed relatively narrowly around this value; however, the distribution 
reveals that there are more sectors with substantial drops in the lambda ratio 
than sectors with substantial increases. This is consistent with the evidence 
we presented earlier indicating that, on net, there has been an increase in 
new varieties entering Japan.
The median lambda ratio for Japan is extremely close to Broda and Wein-
stein’s (2006) computation of the lambda ratio for the United States between 
1990 and 2001 (0.95). Moreover, the distribution of lambda ratios is also 
quite similar. The 5th percentile in Japan is 0.35 compared to 0.34 in the 
United States, and the 95th percentiles are 1.7 and 1.8, respectively. This sug-
gests that the importance of new sources of supply have been approximately 
the same for the two economies. In particular, it suggests that even though 
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in the United States as in Japan, this did not change overall growth in new 
varieties in the two countries.
The distribution of elasticities of substitution is also quite similar to that 
obtained on U.S. data. The median elasticity for Japanese imports is 2.9, 
which is the same value found in Broda and Weinstein (2006). However, the 
distribution of sigmas is somewhat more spread out for Japan, with more 
elasticities taking on both large and small values. If we apply this elastic-
ity estimate to the results of the previous section, then this implies that the 
price- per- unit quality fell by 0.63 ( 1.2/1.9) log units, or 47 percent over this 
time period. This suggests that the reason for the dramatic rise in Chinese 
exports is not price drops but rapid quality upgrading.
When we compute the magnitude of the new good bias as indicated by 
equation (12), we ﬁ  nd it to be 6.1 percent between 1992 and 2005, or about 
0.48 percent per year. This is actually somewhat smaller than Broda and 
Weinstein’s (2006) estimate for the United States between 1990 and 2001 
(0.8 percent per year). This suggests that the impact of variety growth in 
Japan was, if anything, less than that in the United States. In addition, 
the relatively small impact of variety growth on Japanese import prices 
indicates that the entry of low-  cost Chinese exporters cannot be having a 
substantial impact on Japanese prices. Given that Japan’s imports of goods 
and services to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio averaged only 9 percent 
over this time period, the impact of a 0.5 percent per year bias in import 
prices on Japanese deﬂ  ation is only 0.04 percent per year. To the extent 
that new imported varieties simply replaced domestic ones, this may be an 
overestimate. Moreover, if we were to assume that the growth in varieties in 
services imports did not match that of goods, the impact would be smaller 
still. This indicates that there cannot be a large eﬀect of new imported 
varieties in general, and China’s entry into Japanese markets in particular, 
on aggregate Japanese prices.
Table 6.8  Distribution of lambda ratios and sigmas
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6.5    Conclusion
The paper highlights the importance of using the same methodology 
across price indexes when making economic comparisons between them. 
Between 1992 and 2002, the Japanese IPI registered a decline of almost 9 
percent, and Japan entered a period of deﬂ  ation. However, we show that 
this may be due to formula biases. Had the IPI been computed using a pure 
Laspeyres index, the IPI would have hardly moved at all over the same time 
period, indicating that formula bias may be important for interpreting the 
behavior of prices. A Laspeyres version of the IPI would have risen 1 per-
centage point per year faster than the oﬃcial index.
Second, we show that Chinese prices did not behave diﬀerently from the 
prices of other importers. Although Chinese prices tended to be substantially 
lower than the prices of other exporters, they do not exhibit a diﬀerential 
trend. However, we estimate that the typical price- per- unit quality of a Chi-
nese exporter fell by half between 1992 and 2005. Thus, the explosive growth 
in Chinese exports is attributable to growth in the quality of Chinese exports 
and the increase in new products being exported by China.
Finally, the increase in new imported products entering Japan is only 
associated with relatively small price movements. The IPI adjusted for new 
imports rose only 0.5 percentage points per year slower than the unadjusted 
index. This suggests that the very substantial changes in quality and expan-
sion of China in new markets do not appear to have produced much of an 
impact on aggregate Japanese prices. In short, China does not seem to be 
exporting deﬂ  ation to Japan.
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Comment  Joshua Aizenman
The remarkable growth experience of Japan from the 1950s has led observ-
ers in the 1980s to credit Japan with ﬁ  nding a superior system to the U.S. 
capitalism, viewing Japan as the “rising sun” that will overtake the United 
States. Yet the stagﬂ  ation of the 1990s abruptly put the end to these claims, 
inducing some policymakers in Japan to look for external scapegoats stop-
ping Japan’s aspirations to regain its prominence. This interesting paper 
investigates the degree to which the deﬂ  ation-  stagﬂ  ation decade of the 1990s 
in Japan was due to globalization and Chinese imports. After a careful inves-
tigation of these allegations, the authors unambiguously conclude that this 
was not the case.
Chapter’s Investigation Strategy
The authors evaluate carefully the impact that Chinese exports have had 
on Japanese prices during 1992 to 2005, applying a methodology inspired 
by Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006). They use a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator to infer the implied impact of 
new products and quality upgrade on the Japanese cost of living. Regressing 
the shares of products on the Harmonized System (HS) nine- digit year ﬁ  xed 
eﬀects, the residuals are interpreted as the impact of price-  per-  unit quality 
on the market share of that country. The outcome is remarkable: out of the 
100 largest exporters to Japan, China exhibits the highest increase in market 
share due to quality-  adjusted price movements.
The main results show that, while the oﬃcial Japanese import price index 
has fallen over this period, an import price index computed, using the same 
methodology as the consumer price index, would have resulted in substantial 
inﬂ  ation over this period. Given the large growth of varieties coming from 
China, the popular belief that China is exporting deﬂ  ation may be driven by 
the constant introduction of cheap Chinese products in Japanese markets. 
Such new products would reduce the cost of living for consumers if the price-
 per- unit quality of the new product is lower than that of existing products, or 
if the new product is actually adding new valuable choices to the consumers. 
To clarify these issues, the authors use a CES aggregator to back out the 